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Ethics of livestock farming? 
Who cares?
Introduction
Esteemed Rector Magnificus, dear colleagues, family and friends, ladies and 
gentlemen. 
The number of animals in The Netherlands has grown to an all-time high. Tens of 
millions of animals play an important role in different activities as pets, in sports, as 
hobby and companion animals, but they are also used in clinical trials and tests, 
especially in agriculture (Eijsackers and Scholten, 2011). However, Dutch society is 
changing dramatically in relation to societal ideas about agricultural production (LNV, 
2007; Ankersmit, 2010), especially about genetic modification and the use of animals 
(Bruijnis et al., 2015). To mention only a few trends that will reduce animal numbers in 
the long run: a ban on wild circus animals, a ban on mink (six million animals each 
year), a restriction on keeping certain species as pets (‘positieflijst 2017’), and a 20% 
reduction in dairy cows. Besides their role in society, animals are also found in nature 
areas, where humans are causing the sixth global mass extinction of wild animals. A 
future without the need to care for large and medium sized animals seems to lie ahead.
The answer to the second question in the title of my inaugural lecture may also be 
interpreted in a more cynical way: Ethics of livestock farming? Who cares? Does this 
correspond with the thoughts of Francis Kint, the CEO of Vion, on the filmed animal 
abuse in a Belgian slaughterhouse ? (Tuenter, 2017) In a recent NRC interview, he said 
that his first thoughts were that this was bad for the industry, and that it could have 
been prevented by a better layout of the slaughterhouse. Although this is not the 
empathic reaction that concerned people from outside the production system would 
have expected, it is a typical reaction of a professional inside the production system 
who cares for a better system (Bergstra et al., 2015). In the same interview, he 
suggested some innovations to prevent stress, like no bends in the walkway to the 
slaughter site. 
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The take home message is that we need to develop a Moral Operating System of 
animal production systems. An ethics of livestock farming needs more than just 
animal ethics. We need an ethics of animal production systems consisting of three 
interactive, dynamic parts: an internal professional care ethics, external boundary 
conditions based on societal values and concerns in a kind of animal ethics, and an 
emergent ethics in life sciences enabling change by responsible innovation. Together, 
these three parts are the Moral Operating System of a production system.
Hereafter, I will focus on the moral dilemmas of animal production systems. An 
example can be found in Boer zoekt vrouw internationaal, a Dutch television series 
based on the English series Farmer wants a wife. In the episode of Sunday, April 
ninth, Alberdien decides to leave Olke, a Dutch dairy farmer, in Texas. She cannot 
cope with the fact that the nice, healthy young bulls that she fed in the morning will be 
killed, simply for economic reasons. More examples are: the production of plofkippen, 
the mutilation of piglets, and the death of more than fifty million day-old male chicks 
annually. These moral dilemmas arise when societal values clash with the principles 
of an animal production system, because of unintended consequences and risks 
(Alders, 2011). To tackle these moral dilemmas as an ethicist, it is necessary not only to 
be part of a life sciences trajectory of responsible innovation, but also to strengthen 
ethical reflection along the agricultural production chains and among the involved 
stakeholders. What do we mean by ethical reflection in the field of life sciences?
Doing Ethics
Ethics may be studied from several disciplinary backgrounds: law, theology, 
psychology, philosophy, and social science. I study ethics from a philosophical 
background (Petersen and Ryberg, 2007) and define it as the critical, systematic 
reflection on implicit and explicit moral assumptions about what we do. In the 
Philosophy group, our shared strategic vision is  “…that many of the societal and 
scientific challenges in relation to the Wageningen domains involve value conflicts, and 
that scientific understandings and technological solutions are often contested. In a 
pluralistic society, philosophy can offer proactive and constructive ways to deal with 
such value conflicts. Our mission as philosophers is to strengthen reflection on, and 
deliberation about, these problems and about scientific and societal responses, and thus 
to contribute to responsible policies and practices. We do this by engaging in dialogue 
with societal groups, policymakers, professionals, and scientific disciplines, enriching 
their reflection with philosophical questions and perspectives.” (Verweij, 2015). Within 
the strategic research programme of the Philosophy group, my aim is to clarify the 
nature of values such as animal welfare and environmental integrity, and explore 
possibilities for responsible innovation in plant and animal production systems.
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My work in philosophy relates to the tradition of pragmatism in applied philosophy at 
Wageningen University and Research (Keulartz, 2002). This term is not to be taken in a 
strict sense (i.e. ‘pragmatism’ as a very specific philosophical denomination connected 
with the work of James, Dewey, and others), but rather in a more general and broader 
sense (Thompson, 1998). My pragmatic approach starts from case material and 
concrete actual developments, and aims at interdisciplinarity, dialogue, and 
collaboration (Gremmen, 2002 and 2007). Philosophical concepts are used as flexible 
tools that can be adapted to specific contexts. In my work, I apply this empirical way 
of doing philosophy to ethics in life sciences. Whereas academic debates often revolve 
around the question of whether these sciences are benign or a threat (Singer, 1975; 
Sandoe and Christiansen, 2008), I do ethics in life sciences as an embedded ethicist, 
discussing life sciences from within (Gremmen, 2007). This means that the societal 
impact of my work is strengthened by my bottom-up approach. Starting with 
interviews and stakeholder surveys (see Blom and Gremmen, 2012), I analyse, test, 
and deepen the ethical arguments in the results. Afterwards, the stakeholders and 
relevant others are informed to strengthen a constructive ethical dialogue and offer 
them a framework to make responsible decisions. Also, my research is often part of 
consortia aiming to provide companies, policymakers, NGOs with information and 
tools to solve their problems. Is there a suitable ethical approach available? 
Ethics and animals
Clashes of different ethical approaches may be observed in societal debates about 
animals (Thompson, 1998), and I will illustrate this by using the case of Johannes, a 
humpback whale. On 12 December 2012, Johannes beached on the shoreline of De 
Razende Bol, a small uninhabited island between the island of Texel and the city of 
Den Helder in The Netherlands. The whale was stuck on the beach and could not 
return to the water on its own. Not so long ago, humans living nearby would have 
killed the animal immediately, and its remains would have been used for all kinds of 
purposes. In our modern times, we try to save such animals’ lives. Over the course of 
just a few days, Johannes became a national symbol for helping a wild animal in 
need. Political parties, civil servants, scientists, and members of societal organizations 
were engaged not only in debates, but also in rescue and euthanasia attempts. All 
these attempts failed, and the whale eventually died. In the ensuing debate, 
ecologists and nature conservationists still argued against killing dying wild animals 
in distress, whereas the majority of the other participants in the debate argued for a 
humane death for these animals.
At first sight, it seems that humans do not need to be involved at all when wild 
animals die: wild animals are wild precisely because they take care of themselves in 
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areas where they are outside human control. In such situations, wild animals die for 
several different reasons: hunger, thirst, disease, predators, and also as a consequence 
of old age. Humans are often unaware of the fact that, out of their sight, animals 
could be dying. However, sometimes people are confronted with dying wild animals, 
like the beached humpback whale in 2012. What is our moral reference for killing 
wild animals? It seems that, in order to answer these questions, we can rely on 
animal ethics: the moral framework for the killing of domesticated animals. 
According to Dutch law, based on this theory, humans are obliged to help an animal 
in distress. From this ethical perspective, the first duty of humans is to save or help 
individual wild animals in situations where humans are present. When all help fails, 
our second duty is, if possible, to kill these animals in a humane way. The example of 
the humpback whale seems to fit into this scheme because it was an individual 
animal surrounded by humans. However, from the perspective of eco-ethics, wild 
animals are part of ecosystems. Therefore, the focus is on groups and species rather 
than on individual animals. In general, this ethical framework advocates respect for 
the wildness of animals. In the case of dying wild animals, like the humpback whale, 
the eco-ethics ethical framework advises a hands-off strategy. This seems to lead to a 
stalemate between two rival ethical frameworks, thus leaving nature management 
caught between two sets of norms governing animals and nature.
If we see some ethological distance in the dualism between ‘wild’ and ‘tame’, all 
kinds of intermediary shades appear. Also, the number of situations in which humans 
have to decide to kill wild animals increases considerably. The humpback whale is an 
example of an individual wild animal in distress. We may consider this situation as 
bad luck and exceptional. But what about lost or abandoned baby seals on the shores 
of the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark? When we locate these animals, do we 
help them by bringing them to a shelter? Do we have to kill them on the spot or leave 
them alone to die? Other examples are weak or dying animals in nature parks like the 
Oostvaardersplassen in The Netherlands (Gremmen, 2016) and exotic animals that 
are destroying the biodiversity of an area. In earlier research, we argued that the 
relation between animal ethics and eco-ethics in these cases is not a dichotomy, but a 
continuum. Because animal ethics is about individual animals in hands-on situations, 
and eco-ethics is about groups of animals and species in hands-off situations, groups 
of animals in agricultural hands-on situations do not belong to either ethics. What is a 
suitable ethics of animals in agricultural production systems?
Ethics of agricultural production systems
Recently, care ethics has been developed as an ethical approach (Loewy and 
Springer, 2004). I agree with Hans Harbers (2009) that care ethics is the most 
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promising integrative framework for ethics of animal production systems. Care 
ethics focuses on values that are important for the maintenance and flourishing of 
(care) relationships, such as commitment, dependency, responsibility, and care 
(Devettre, 2009). An important aim of caring is to create shared values for all 
stakeholders involved in the production chain. In agricultural systems, people care 
for plants and animals in the two senses of the word ‘care’: ‘care for’ and ‘care about’ 
(being concerned). Good farming is a matter of endless care, in various shapes and 
sizes (Scholten et al., 2013). Good care requires the involvement of all stakeholders in 
the production chain, but also of citizens, consumers, civil society, and government 
(Harbers, 2009). As a consequence, care is always accompanied by societal concerns. 
This can be illustrated by the Wakker Dier campaign. Six obituaries of organic cows 
appeared on 3 April 2017 in the Dutch newspaper Trouw. Miep 140, Rikkie 65, and 
Witkop 36, cows from the organic dynamic dairy farm, Schermereylandt, were 
slaughtered to comply with the European Union’s manure regulation. Although care 
is firmly embedded in economic activity, this does not automatically imply the 
primacy of the economy (Harbers, 2009). In my view, caring also means the 
responsibility to take care of the situation in farming by contributing to innovative 
processes, and thereby contributing to society. This entails clarity about 
responsibilities as an essential element for an excellent organization of a caring 
farming system (Goede et al., 2013)
In a number of innovation areas, such as genomics, synthetic biology, and animal 
welfare, ethicists are asked to help to solve moral problems in the early stages of 
innovation  (e.g. Singer, 1986). Can ethicists help to solve moral problems in the early 
stages of innovation? In the past, ethics often seemed to lag behind technical 
progress, and, according to Grunwald (2010), as a response ethics joined the move 
towards ‘upstream engagement’ in the field of Science and Technology Studies. As 
early as 1980, David Collingridge wrote a book on the social control of technology 
with the objective of avoiding the harmful social consequences of a new technology 
(Collingridge, 1980). This may be done by changing technology in its infancy by 
imposing on it all kinds of controls and restrictions. Two conditions are necessary to 
avoid the undesired consequences of a new technology: “It must be known that a 
technology has, or will have, harmful effects, and it must be possible to change the 
technology in some way to avoid the effects.” (Collingridge, 1980) One or both of the 
conditions are often lacking, and attempts to control technology seldom succeed: the 
‘dilemma of control’. The first horn of the dilemma is that the harmful social 
consequences of the fully developed technology cannot be predicted with sufficient 
confidence to justify the imposition of control. The second horn of the dilemma is 
that, by the time a technology is sufficiently well developed and diffused for its 
unwanted social consequences to become apparent, it is no longer easily controlled. 
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Control may still be possible, but it will have become very difficult, expensive, and 
slow. What happens is that society and the rest of its technology gradually adapt to 
the new technology, so that, when it is fully developed, any major change in this new 
technology requires changes in many other technologies and social and economic 
institutions, making its control very disruptive and expensive (Collingridge, 1980, 19). 
An important assumption of the Collingridge dilemma is the consequentialist/
utilitarian perspective in ethics. The normative starting point of the dilemma is the 
need to avoid the harmful social consequences of a technology, but the message of 
the dilemma is that a consequentialist/utilitarian perspective is impossible. In the 
early phases of a new technology, ethical deliberations become speculative because 
we lack the required knowledge (Grunwald, 2010). In the later phases of a new 
technology, ethical deliberations often come too late, namely, when all of the relevant 
decisions have already been made, when it is too late to avoid harmful consequences 
of the technology. Collingridge’s own normative response to the dilemma is to 
maintain the ‘freedom to control technology’, because the essence of controlling 
technology is to retain “… the ability to change a technology, even when it is fully 
developed and diffused, so that any unwanted social consequences it may prove to 
have can be eliminated or meliorated.” (Collingridge, 1980, 20/21) He suggests 
developing organizational structures and scientific tools to deal with the resistance to 
such control (ibid., 19). Experts, decision makers, and end-users all are entangled in 
controlling the new technology. 
However, Collingridge did not foresee that some experts were going to use a version 
of his control dilemma as a normative tool in their attempts to exclude prospective 
users from the innovation process. Experts sometimes stress that they are willing to 
include users in the early stages of the new technology (Gremmen, 2007), when there 
is still a lot of room to take the voice of prospective users into account in the design of 
the product, but the experts can offer little concrete information that would allow 
prospective users to imagine how they could integrate the end-product in their 
everyday life. This version of the Collingridge dilemma depicts the end-users in the 
emergence of new technologies as the end-point of a linear process. However, the 
world of the users and the world of technological innovation are by no means 
separate entities that only merge when a final product is delivered to the users; they 
are already entangled from the start. Technology assessment, and, later, constructive 
technology assessment, recognized the importance of involving users in the 
innovation process to encourage integration of new technologies in users’ everyday 
lives (Rip et al., 1995; Oudshoorn and Pinch, 2003). The case has been made that 
technologists need to study responses to science in order to learn from them (Levitt, 
2003) and to discover missing propositions in their own reasoning (Locke, 2002). 
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Everyday-life concerns that inform people’s responses to emergent technologies may 
be at odds with scientific and technological standards but can and should be 
understood on their own terms. In this way, experts could benefit from the active 
involvement of prospective users (Veen, 2010).
I think that it is difficult for ethicists to assist innovators, because most normative 
ethical theories have problems in dealing with the future. Not only do the results of 
an innovation trajectory have unknown consequences, but, more importantly, we do 
not know the results of innovation at the start of the innovation trajectory (Wathes et 
al., 2008). This means that, in moral reasoning about innovations in the making, the 
relevant moral facts and the appropriate principles are more or less still unknown, as 
also the relevant moral consequences. For that reason, I describe the third part of the 
Moral Operating System of animal production systems as emergent. Only by doing 
ethics in life sciences will the moral dilemmas emerge in the trajectory of responsible 
innovation. Future projects will describe and analyse the main characteristics of an 
emergent ethics of animal production systems. Examples of these characteristics are 
moral lock-in, the slippery slope, instrumentalization, and commodification. These 
are discussed in the following two research themes, molecular technologies in animal 
sciences and precision livestock farming. 
Molecular technologies in animal sciences
In plants and animals, the basic genetics is more or less the same, but the application 
of some methods and technologies differ (Barnes and Dupre, 2008). For example, 
mutation breeding – increasing the mutation frequency through chemicals or 
radiation – is a common and legal method for plants, but it is not possible in animals, 
for both ethical and economic reasons (Shu et al., 2011). Marker assisted selection and 
genetic modification (GM) have been used in plant breeding (Gremmen, 2005) for 
many years, but genetic modification has not yet been applied in livestock on a large 
scale (Gremmen, 2009). The only approval given for a GM animal for food 
production is Canada’s approval of AquAdvantage salmon eggs, with a focus on 
growth enhancement (Goubau, 2011). Other examples of GM animals are pigs (i.e. 
increased growth rates and higher utilization of phosphate in their feed), dairy cows 
(enhanced resistance to mastitis and improved udder health, and improved milk 
quality), goats and sheep (improved wool production and disease resistance), and 
chickens (resistance to diseases and feed efficiency) (Thompson, 2007).
There are different kinds of ethical arguments about controversial life sciences 
technologies (Rollin, 1995). On the critical side, some people have objections to a 
particular technology as such. In the case of genetic modification for example, this 
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argument amounts to the claim that it is unnatural and therefore morally problematic 
(Siipi, 2004; Haperen et al. 2012). Many critics might not be so much opposed to GM 
technology as such, but more to its different applications (Rollin, 2006). From a 
consequentialist stance, this means that even people who do not have an objection in 
principle to the technology can still be critical of its use in agriculture in general, and 
in food production in particular (Sandoe and Christiansen, 2008). Current 
applications of agricultural biotechnology have also been criticized from the 
viewpoint of justice, in particular with respect to the distribution of economic 
benefits from its use (Thompson, 2007). Some critics emphasize the risks and 
uncertainties with this new technology, and argue either that there are risks to 
human health or the environment, or that there might be such risks, and that for this 
reason some version of the precautionary principle should be applied (Gremmen, 
2006). Ethics may clarify and test such arguments and explicate normative and 
epistemic assumptions. In livestock farming, genetic modification may contribute to 
all kinds of efficiency benefits but, at the same time, may be used to circumvent 
certain ethical problems (Hanssen and Gremmen, 2013). Our NWO project on the 
ethics of genetically modified chickens can illustrate this (Bruinis et al., 2016; 
Gremmen et al., forthcoming).
In response to the increasing demand for safe and cheap food in sufficient quantities, 
the intensification and mechanization of poultry farming began in the mid-twentieth 
century. The number of chickens kept by any one farmer has increased considerably 
since then. Efficiency and specialization were enabled by developments in feeding, 
breeding, housing of the animals, and increased knowledge of veterinary medicine. 
Genetic selection enabled egg production by layer-type chickens and chicken meat 
production using specialized meat-type chickens. Therefore, male chicks from 
layer-type chickens became less attractive for meat production. With the available 
sexing techniques, which made it possible to distinguish males from females 
immediately after hatching, it became common practice to kill these male day-old 
chicks. 
In the Netherlands, over 50 million male chickens are killed annually immediately 
after hatching. Societal opposition to this practice has prompted the development of 
innovations. Several alternatives to the killing of day-old chicks have been proposed 
(Leenstra et al., 2010); this leads to the question of whether these alternatives are 
morally superior. We have developed a framework to evaluate the technical and 
socio-ethical aspects of alternative directions of more responsible innovations to solve 
this issue, selected on social desirability and technical potential compared to the 
current situation (Leenstra et al., 2010). One alternative direction aims to use genetic 
modification in the breeding of laying hens in such a way that the hatching eggs 
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containing males can easily be identified with spectroscopy, a non-invasive technique 
compared to the technique of taking a sample from the egg to find the difference 
between male and female eggs. The GM alternative takes advantage of the genetics of 
birds to ensure GM-free laying hens, and also that their eggs are GM free.
This clear case of a morally inferior practice has potentially morally better 
alternatives. Besides the GM alternative, there are several others: raising the male 
chicks, dual use of chickens, taking a sample from the egg, etcetera. Each alternative 
has its advantages and disadvantages with respect to technical and socio-ethical 
aspects, and each has a specific importance for various stakeholders. Solving one 
issue raised by the current situation throws up new issues. For example, by 
acknowledging arguments against the killing of such young animals and starting to 
rear the males, issues arise around the impact on the environment and the marketing 
of the chicks. The issue of killing day-old chicks and its alternatives thus seems to be 
an example of choosing the least of several possible evils and can be explained by a 
special type of moral lock-in. 
Since the mid-1980s, technological lock-in has become an important subject of 
growing academic enquiry in the field of innovation studies, especially by economists 
working within an evolutionary tradition (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). The general 
idea of lock-in is that technologies and technological systems follow specific paths 
that are difficult and costly to escape (Perkins, 2003). Even if potentially superior 
alternatives are available, these technologies and technological systems often survive 
for a very long time. The famous examples in the literature are the triumph of the 
QWERTY keyboard layout over the Dvorak Simplified Keyboard layout (David, 1985) 
and the race between VHS and Betamax as a video cassette recorder standard 
(Arthur, 1990). In the literature, lock-in is explained by the increasing returns of an 
initial lead in the competition between technologies (David, 1985; Arthur, 1989). “This 
arises because early adoption can generate a snowballing effect whereby the preferred 
technology benefits from greater improvement than its competitors, stimulating 
further adoption, improvement, and eventual leadership “(Perkins, 2003, 23).
There are many ways in which locked-in technologies may be inferior to their 
alternatives. We focus on moral lock-in: the way a production system can be locked-
in to technology standards that are potentially morally inferior. In some cases, there 
is consensus on the potential for moral improvement that could be achieved through 
the development of alternative technologies. The question then becomes: What is 
holding back the development of these morally better technologies? Many debates 
about the transition to these new technologies focus only on the costs involved 
(Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2013). Our hypothesis is that a kind of moral lock-in may 
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explain the survival of morally inferior technologies. We consider Responsible 
Innovation, a concept for balancing economic, socio-cultural, and environmental 
aspects in innovation processes (EC, 2011), as an approach to morally ‘unlock’ 
alternative innovations. By involving stakeholders in the innovation process and by 
considering ethical and societal aspects during this process, the socio-ethical 
acceptability and the societal desirability of innovative products will increase 
significantly (Schomberg, 2013; Blok and Lemmens, 2015).
Recent genetic engineering techniques, like CRISPR/Cas9, have come into use in 
plant breeding in a short time (Zhang et al., 2014). These so-called genome editing 
techniques are cheaper, faster, more accurate, and more widely applicable than older 
techniques because of their ability to cut and alter the DNA of any species at almost 
any genomic site with ease and precision (Jasanoff et al., 2015). They have been 
developed to overcome the problem of randomness that results from mutation 
breeding and to be able to determine the site of mutation or insertion of genes. 
Applications of animal gene editing techniques are many, varied, and rapidly 
evolving, including applications that promise benefits in welfare, in disease 
resistance, and in feed efficiency. Although the gene editing technology promises 
significant benefit, this promise will not be realized unless the technology is firmly 
and fully embedded in society. My aim is to adapt and broaden the existing ethical 
frameworks on biotechnology (Holland and Johnson, 1998; Rollin, 1995) to these new 
scientific methods and technologies. This will help scientists, stakeholders, and 
policymakers to understand, evaluate, and monitor the integration of the technical, 
social, and ethical aspects of the modern GM toolbox. 
In a joint project of Wageningen University and Research, Utrecht University, and 
several companies, we are refining and applying the responsible innovation approach 
to the technique of animal gene editing to guide the development of the technology 
and help ensure that applications are embedded in society. Animal scientists, social 
scientists, and ethicists will work together to anticipate possible impacts and 
implications, open up inclusive dialogue with stakeholders and wider publics, 
develop reflexive scientific and corporate cultures, and ensure that the science that 
develops is responsive to these processes. We have set out an integrated programme 
of research, applying the use of animal gene editing across three waves of research 
application: (a) editing to improve animal welfare (starting with the one-edited gene 
enabling dehorning in cattle); (b) editing for disease resistance (involving more 
complex traits); and (c) editing for feed efficiency (involving really complex traits). In 
this project, we will develop a responsible innovation approach to animal gene 
editing that will guide the responsible development of the technology and support 
responsible decision making at the level of breeding companies and governments.
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Precision livestock farming
Precision livestock farming, the second research theme, is the application of smart 
farming technologies and a relatively new phenomenon in the agricultural sector 
(Reichardt et al., 2009). In smart farming, computers, sensoring devices, GPS systems, 
but also robots and even animals, communicate with one another and function 
autonomously in an integrated farm management system. In this way, farmers can 
reduce farm inputs (fertilizers and pesticides) and increase yields, while reducing 
emissions to the environment (Bos and Munnichs, 2016). In precision livestock 
farming, the internet of things is extended to farm animals. PLF can be defined as the 
management of livestock production using the principles and technology of process 
engineering.  PLF treats livestock production as a set of interlinked processes, which 
act together in a complex network.(Wathes et al., 2008) The introduction of this type 
of integrated farm management system enables farmers to control the production 
process by monitoring and controlling animal growth, behaviour, and health, the 
production of milk and eggs, the physical environment of livestock buildings, and 
greenhouse gas emissions and other pollution to the environment. Furthermore, the 
exchange of information about health and milk quality enables supply chain actors to 
optimize coordination and efficiency throughout the supply chain. 
An example of PLF can be found in the dairy sector, where PLF has emerged with 
the concept of automatic or robotic milking (De Koning and Rodenburg, 2004). Rising 
labour costs in the mid-1970s in Europe was one of the main reasons for increasing 
automation in the milking sector (Sauer and Zilberman, 2012). An automatic milking 
system is equipped with electronic cow identification, cleaning, and milking devices 
and computer-controlled sensors to detect, for example, abnormalities in milk. The 
system also provides remote notification to the farmer if intervention is required (De 
Koning, 2011). The largest number of dairy farms using automatic milking systems is 
found in the Netherlands, with almost 2,000 farms. Automatic milking relies heavily 
on the cow’s motivation to visit the automatic milking system. The main motive for 
this is the supply of concentrates dispensed in a feed manager in the milking box 
during the milking process (De Koning, 2011).
 
A more comprehensive application of PLF, so-called precision dairy farming, focuses 
on the transition from a group-oriented perspective to a perspective where intensive 
consideration is given to individual cows, and where particular goals, such as tapping 
individual potential, diagnosing diseases early, and using minimum medication, are 
pursued (Sauer and Zilberman, 2012). Hence, advanced automatic milking systems are 
equipped with various sensors ranging from sensors that control the milking process 
to sensors that analyse the milk quality in several ways, such as milk composition, cell 
counts, blood detection, conductivity, progesterone, and so on. Because of increased 
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information density, all these sensors require smart data-handling solutions to help 
the livestock manager to make the right decisions (De Koning, 2011).
Although smart farming technologies provide economic, social, and environmental 
opportunities for the agricultural sector, they also raise ethical issues associated with 
the increased corporatization and industrialization of the agricultural sector. PLF 
facilitates the slippery slope of further intensification of livestock farming and the 
emergence of mega stalls with various socio-ethical consequences (Bos and 
Gremmen, 2013). Another ethical issue is the possible alienation of animals, farmers, 
and citizens because of the robotization and digitalization of farm management 
systems. Finally, farmers have to share all kinds of information about their farm 
management with processors and retailers who can take (economic) advantage of 
this information. In this respect, PLF may lead to the concentration of economic 
power in the process industry, with retailers as linchpins in matching supply and 
demand within the supply chain (Bos and Munnichs, 2016). Therefore, we may 
expect society to be reluctant to accept smart farming technologies because of the 
ongoing industrialization of the agricultural sector. This will lead to a call for a 
human and natural scale of agricultural practices, notwithstanding the potential of 
smart farming technologies to feed the increasing world population and to mitigate 
climate change, for instance. 
This reluctance to accept the industrialization of farming practices can be understood 
as a resistance against the conceptualization of the natural environment as a 
commodity for human needs, in which nature’s own strategies and principles of 
operation are neglected – natural animal growth and behaviour for instance – and, 
instead, nature is challenged to supply efficiently agri-food products as commodities in 
an instrumental economic exchange among chain actors. A consequent call for farming 
practices that are better embedded in the natural environment, like multi-functional 
agriculture, organic farming, and so forth, can already be recognized in current 
Western societies, even if these practices are disadvantageous for feeding the world 
and mitigating climate change. Because of the potential advantage of smart farming 
technologies, we raise the question of how to conceptualize smart farming technologies 
that are no longer characterized by the instrumentalization and commodification of 
nature, but instead are embedded in, and in accordance with, the natural environment.
Education
Compared to other subjects on BSc or MSc programmes at Wageningen University 
and Research, ethics is rather different. Instead of data, calculations, formulas, and 
models, ethics is all about texts and reasoning. We have to support students in 
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developing new skills that will enable them to apply ethics in science itself and also 
in the interface between society and science. New didactic tools, like interactive 
software, will be very important in developing step-by-step ethics programmes 
through the five years of a student’s education. As Philosophy group, we will use a 
philosophical and ethical tool box and apply it to a case-study approach. For the 
graduate school WIAS, we have developed a new PhD course with two modules 
about scientific integrity and animal ethics. My attempts to stimulate MSc students to 
write a joint paper about their major or minor theses or exam papers succeeded this 
month with the acceptance of a paper for publication in the journal Ethics in Progress 
about political parties and environmental ethics: the case of the Dutch Party for the 
Animals (i.e. Otten and Gremmen, 2017).
Some words of thanks
Let me conclude with some words of thanks.
I would like to thank the tenure track committee, especially Tjard de Cock Buning 
who helped me to realize my dream for the second time, Laan van Staalduinen, past 
director of the Social Sciences Group, and Jack van der Vorst, current director of the 
Social Sciences Group, for their trust in me. I also thank the Board of Wageningen 
University and Research for appointing me as personal professor.
Former colleagues of META, the centre for Methodical Ethics and Technology 
Assessment: thanks for your very pleasant and constructive pushes in the right 
direction. I would like to give my profound thanks and gratitude to Marcel Verweij for 
his support and advice. He gives people the space they need to excel. I would like to 
thank my colleagues in the Philosophy group, but also in the Strategic Communication 
group and the KTI group: it is a pleasure working with you all. I thank Vincent Blok 
for being as an inspiring philosopher and an excellent collaborator. For many years, 
the members of the employees’ council have kept me in sight of the bigger picture.
I thank Richard Visser and my colleagues in the Plant Breeding group for their support 
for more than a decade. You have shown me the beauty and benefits of domesticated 
plants. I thank Herman van Eck, Arjen Schots, Aska Goverse and Matthieu Joosten, and 
Jakob Wallings who enable my role as philosopher and ethicist on a number of courses.
In the last five years, the Adaptation Physiology group has also been very generous 
in helping me to find my way in the world of animal sciences. Thanks to all the 
colleagues, and especially to Bas Kemp, Elsbeth Stassen, Nanette van Hapert, and 
Lora van der Kleijn who make me feel at home at Zodiac. 
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I further wish to acknowledge my foreign colleagues for their help and inspiration: 
Don Ihde, Paul Thompson, Julian Savulescu, at EurSafe, the European Society of 
Agricultural and Food Ethics, and ISHS, the International Society for Hermeneutics 
of Science. I am also looking forward to cooperating further with my colleagues at 
two different centres: the centre of 4TU.Ethics and the new centre for Sustainable 
Animal Stewardship.
I warmly thank my friends who every Thursday have kept me healthy and relaxed 
(except when I lost a game of squash): Gerard, Evert, Ton, John, Rob, Paul, and Peter.
My thanks goes to my family, to my sister Tina, brothers Geert and  Rene, to my 
daughter Martine and her partner Vincent, and my son Pieter and his partner Nina. 
Special thanks to my wife Nardie for her never-ending support and love. My 
beautiful granddaughter Fabienne makes me future proof.
Finally, I would like to thank you all for participating in this inaugural lecture.
Ik heb gezegd.
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'Concerns about livestock farming mainly focus on animal welfare. 
Societal groups address livestock farmers on their duty of care 
because more and more animals are kept in increasingly intensive 
systems. Most farmers, as caring farmers, are willing to take 
various measures to improve the welfare of their animals. 
However, not all solutions to animal welfare problems are seen  
as a welfare improvement or give rise to other welfare concerns. 
How will farmers be able to perform their duty of care?'
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